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Using a unique dataset of the detailed portfolio holdings of US money market funds, we study 
the behaviour of such funds in the context of the European sovereign debt crisis. These 
important players in the shadow banking sector were particularly vulnerable to liquidity shocks 
before the introduction of minimum liquidity requirements. We analyse the impact of these 
requirements and show that they have considerably increased the resilience of prime funds. We 
also see that prime funds increase their liquidity to counter expected investors’ redemptions in 
crisis periods. However, liquidity does not shelter risky funds from lower inflows.  
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The global financial crisis has exposed the inherent weaknesses of the shadow banking 
system. Money-market mutual funds (MMFs), which are a sizeable part of the shadow banking 
sector, came under increased regulatory scrutiny due to their vulnerability to runs and their 
systemic risk potential. In response, there have been two waves of regulatory reforms to make 
the funds more resilient. In this paper, we specifically study the impact of liquidity 
requirements on the behaviour, resilience and portfolio composition of MMFs. 
Money market funds are perceived to be safe because of their ability to provide same-day 
liquidity and preserve investment value. This has attracted a risk-averse shareholder base 
which, faced with the possibility of capital losses during the subprime crisis, prompted 
substantial share redemptions. Prime MMFs were particularly affected due to their higher risk 
investments in corporate debt instruments. The sizeable outflows from MMFs caused short-
term funding markets to shrink considerably, resulting in a credit crunch. Large-scale 
government interventions followed (see Fed Board 2009, SEC 2009, and President's Working 
Group on Financial Markets 2010).  These events were repeated, to a lesser extent, during the 
European sovereign debt crisis. As the Eurozone crisis worsened, concerns mounted about 
substantial US prime funds’ exposure to Eurozone banks. As a consequence, MMF 
shareholders withdrew approximately $162 billion between June and August 2011. The 
sizeable outflows posed the risk of straining money markets (FSOC 2011). According to 
Chernenko and Sunderam (2014), these redemptions led to reduced lending to creditworthy 
non-European issuers. Moreover, McCabe et al. (2013) argue that redemptions from prime 
funds caused a decrease in the supply of lending to non-financial US firms, thus adversely 
affecting the economy. In response, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
introduced two reforms. The first, in May 2010, was intended to improve the resilience and 
transparency of MMFs. This reform required MMFs to increase liquidity, decrease average 
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portfolio maturity, understand the behaviour of their investors and adjust their portfolio 
composition accordingly. After further runs during the sovereign debt crisis in 2011, the SEC 
introduced a second set of rules in October 2014. These rules impose additional restrictions on 
liquidity and portfolio concentration, improve reporting requirements and effect structural 
changes in the MMF industry.  
Our contributions to the relevant literature are as follows. First, we collate a unique dataset, 
which includes detailed portfolio holdings of MMFs before and after the 2010 reform. To the 
best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to assess the effectiveness of this reform by using 
detailed pre- and post-reform data. The 2010 reform mandated prime funds to hold at least 10% 
and 30% of their assets in daily and weekly liquid securities2, respectively, and restricted the 
weighted average life (WAL) of their portfolio to be no more than 120 days. We find that the 
funds for which the new liquidity requirements were binding (constrained funds) reallocated 
capital that was initially invested in riskier, longer maturity securities to very short-term 
securities and/or government securities. This leads to a safer asset mix and positions funds to 
be more resilient to unexpected outflows. Further, following the reform, we determine that 
portfolio risk declined with a negative impact on the funds’ profitability.  
Second, with our pre-reform data, we perform a counterfactual analysis to show how the 
2010 reform influenced MMFs to adjust their excess liquidity during the sovereign debt crisis. 
We evaluate changes in daily and weekly excess liquidity for both constrained and 
unconstrained funds following the reform. We find that constrained funds respond to the reform 
with a statistically significant increase in excess weekly liquidity. We also find that with the 
                                                          
2 According to the SEC, daily liquid assets include cash, any security that matures within 1 business day or has a 
demand feature that allows the fund to convert it to cash within 1 business day, and US Treasury securities of any 
maturity. Weekly liquid assets include cash, any security that matures within 5 business days or has a demand 
feature that allows the fund to convert it into cash within 5 business days, US government agency securities that 




liquidity levels observed before the reform, 18% and 29% of the constrained funds would have 
lacked enough weekly and daily liquidity, respectively, to cover the redemptions in the worst 
month of the sovereign debt crisis. Unconstrained funds do not substantially increase either 
daily or weekly liquidity but still keep higher liquidity levels than constrained funds do. In this 
respect, unconstrained funds appear to preserve their distinctive features (i.e. higher 
safety/liquidity) as a way to differentiate themselves from constrained competitors. We 
conjecture that this may be a strategy to attract wealthy and risk-averse institutional investors. 
Third, we test the ‘know your investor’ requirement of the new 2010 rules, which compels 
funds to adjust their liquidity levels according to the expected behaviour of their shareholders. 
We extend previous studies by investigating the impact of expected outflows, as opposed to 
observed outflows. We show that higher expected outflows lead funds to keep higher liquidity 
as a precautionary measure. However, such a response is present only in crisis periods when 
outflows could impair the solvency of the fund. 
Fourth, we extend the analysis of Jank and Wedow (2015), who examine the relationship 
between fund liquidity and inflows for German funds, as well as that of Witmer (2018), who 
focuses on a similar line of enquiry for US money funds, while also distinguishing between 
internal and external funds.3 With our sample of US prime MMFs, we re-evaluate the role of 
daily and weekly liquidity in mitigating outflows if a fund’s portfolio is perceived to carry 
considerable credit risk. In the context of the sovereign debt crisis, we use the level of Eurozone 
bank holdings as a credit risk proxy, as done in previous research (e.g. Chernenko et al. 2014 
and Witmer 2018). When the sovereign debt crisis worsened in 2011, the credit default spreads 
of Eurozone banks started to increase sharply. This caused concerns about the solvency of 
Eurozone banks, leading to massive withdrawals from exposed funds. Contrary to previous 
findings, we observe that higher daily and weekly liquidity does not necessarily offer 
                                                          
3 Internal funds are those for which more than 20% of their shares are beneficially held by affiliated entities. 
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meaningful protection to risky funds against outflows when markets are unstable. In this sense, 
investors appear to have overriding concerns about the preservation of capital, even when the 
funds can more effectively meet redemptions.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we briefly introduce 
shadow banks and MMFs. In section 3, we describe the data. The empirical analysis and results 
are presented in section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Institutional Background  
The term ‘shadow banking’ was coined by McCulley (2007) to collectively describe levered 
non-bank investment conduits, vehicles and structures. Since the onset of the global financial 
crisis, academics and policymakers have adopted this term (Pozsar 2008, Adrian and Shin 
2009, Gorton and Metrick 2010, FSB 2011, Pozsar et al. 2012). Pozsar et al. (2012) define 
shadow banks as ‘financial intermediaries that conduct credit, maturity, and liquidity 
transformation without access to central bank liquidity or public-sector credit guarantees’4. The 
shadow banking system grew substantially in the years before the Great Recession. Figure 1 
shows that the US MMFs alone reached a peak of $3.83 trillion in 2008, which is more than a 
quarter of total bank assets. In 2018, US shadow banks and banks are similar in size with total 
financial assets of $18.27 trillion dollar and $19.19 trillion dollar, respectively.5 Figure 2 
illustrates the importance of MMFs relative to other financial institutions in the commercial 
paper market. The expansion in the shadow banking sector is attributable to genuine demand 
(Sunderam 2015), financial innovation, regulatory arbitrage and agency problems in financial 
markets (Pozsar et al. 2012).  
                                                          
4 Shadow banks include finance companies, asset-backed commercial paper conduits, limited-purpose finance 
companies, structured investment vehicles, credit hedge funds, money market mutual funds, securities lenders and 
government-sponsored enterprises.  
5 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve: Financial Accounts of the United States at 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/, the author’s own calculations. 
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We focus on MMFs, a sizeable part of the shadow banking sector.  In the United States, 
MMFs are registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 and regulated by the SEC 
under Rule 2a-7. This rule imposes liquidity and diversification requirements, maturity limits, 
portfolio quality restrictions, enhanced disclosure and stress-testing requirements. Money 
market funds were established to counter the limits on the interest payable on bank deposits 
and the limits on the amount of deposits insured. They offered higher interest rates and, by 
using collateral-based overnight repurchase agreements, they created new instruments that 
closely resemble insured deposits, but without restrictions on the insured amount. Some 
researchers consider MMFs as ‘narrow banks’ that are reliable liquidity providers even in times 
of crisis (Miles 2001 and Pennacchi 2006). Indeed, from 1983, when SEC Rule 2a-7 was first 
introduced, to September 2008, when the Reserve Primary Fund lowered its share price below 
$1 due to its exposure to Lehman Brothers, only one fund ‘broke the buck’ in 1994.  
 Money market mutual funds invest in short-term money market instruments. These funds 
serve two main purposes. First, they are crucial suppliers of short-term funding and hold large 
amounts of debt instruments issued by financial and non-financial institutions. Second, they 
serve as a valuable cash management apparatus for individuals, firms, institutions and 
governments.  
In this paper, we specifically investigate US prime MMFs. These funds are important 
suppliers of credit to short-term credit markets, particularly because they are not restricted to 
investing in government securities. Their assets also include repurchase agreements, 
certificates of deposit, commercial paper and asset-backed commercial paper, bank notes and 
corporate notes with a remaining maturity of no more than 397 days. Previous crisis episodes 
have shown that distress in prime MMFs cause disruptions in the short-term credit markets, 




3. Data description  
This paper examines detailed portfolio holding reports of MMFs which are filed with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission monthly (N-MFP), quarterly (N-Q), semi-annually (N-
CSRS) and annually (N-CSR). These reports are publicly available from the SEC EDGAR 
database.  
The amendments to Rule 2a-7 that were introduced in May 2010 require MMFs to file a 
monthly report on form N-MFP, which includes a detailed schedule of the portfolio holdings 
of money funds, starting from November 2010. This form provides information about fund-
level variables such as total net assets, types of share classes, gross yield, and monthly 
shareholder subscriptions and redemptions. In addition, for each security held, form N-MFP 
reports the issuer name, amount of principal, yield, legal maturity date, and the CUSIP number. 
Before November 2010, portfolio holdings are available quarterly. The funds’ management 
companies were required to report portfolio holdings on the N-Q form in the first and third 
quarters and on the N-CSRS form in the second and fourth quarters. We use three different 
forms - N-Q, N-CSRS and N-CSR - filed by the funds to build a pre-reform dataset which 
provides snapshots of portfolio data for each quarter from January to December 2009.6 The 
reporting on these forms, in contrast to N-MFP, is not standardised, and therefore partly 
requires manual extraction. We then use an algorithm to create a standardised dataset. 
Restrictions on the WAL and daily/weekly liquidity did not exist before the SEC amendments 
to Rule 2a-7 in May 2010. As a result, they are not reported on these forms. Therefore, we 
calculate these variables ourselves (Appendix A.1).  
To measure the exposure of prime MMFs to Eurozone banks, which constituted the main 
source of instability in the summer of 2011 during the sovereign debt crisis, we aggregate 
                                                          
6 N-Q, N-CSRS and N-CSR contain information about multiple funds managed by the same management 
company. We extract only the relevant data for prime MMFs.  
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issuer-level variables to the parent level. We then assign a country to the parent firm and 
determine whether the overall exposure to the parent firm is within the Eurozone. For instance, 
the securities issued by Bank of the West, Fortis Funding LLC, Scaldis Capital LLC, and 
Starbird Funding Corporation - as well the debt issued by BNP Paribas SA - are all aggregated 
under the parent company BNP Paribas SA, which is associated with France and treated as a 
Eurozone exposure.7  
In addition to a fund’s net yield as a measure of portfolio risk, in our robustness tests, we 
employ a portfolio’s expected loss. Following Collins and Gallagher (2016), we calculate the 
expected loss at maturity (ELMft) by using the default probabilities for the issuers of the 
securities held by the fund. Default probabilities are obtained from the Risk Management 
Institute (RMI) of the National University of Singapore. We match monthly portfolio holdings 
of prime funds issuer-by-issuer and maturity-by-maturity.8  
Our final dataset spans from January 2009 to December 2013. We divide the data into a pre-
reform period (January 2009-December 2009)9,10 and a post-reform period (February 2011-
                                                          
7 The N-MFP form does not specify the country, industry sector of the issuers or their parent company. We collect 
this information from various other datasets. Since the CUSIP number of the issuers is given, we use it to link the 
data extracted from the N-MFP forms with other datasets. These include Amadeus, Bankscope, Osiris and 
Bloomberg as well as the WRDS database for the CUSIP master file.    
8 RMI generates daily forward-looking default probabilities (PDs) for maturities of 1, 3, 6, 12 and 24 months 
ahead. To match the default probabilities and maximise issuer coverage, we make several assumptions. We 
linearly interpolate default probabilities to match maturities outside of those provided by the RMI. We also need 
probabilities for securities with a remaining maturity of less than 1 month. We assume that a security with a 
remaining maturity of 1 day has no risk; therefore, its probability of default is zero. This allows linearly 
interpolating between maturities from 1 to 30 days. In addition, we assume that US Treasury, government agency 
and municipal issuers present minimal risk and, therefore, have a zero probability of default for all maturities. We 
then match the annualised default probabilities with the parent firms of the issuers obtained from the N-MFP form. 
The funds for which less than 75% of their securities can be matched with the default probabilities are removed 
from the analysis. These represent only 5% of the funds. On average, 92% of the total net assets of the prime 
funds in our sample match default probabilities. Once we obtain all PDs, we use them to calculate the expected 
loss of a fund portfolio as the value-weighted probability of default of a fund’s portfolio multiplied by the loss 
rate in default.  
9 For this period, only quarterly observations are available for each fund. For each quarter, the snapshot of portfolio 
holdings is provided for the reporting date. For consistency, other periods are also divided into 4-month periods.  
10 We examine this period for two reasons. First, before Q1 2009 in Q3-Q4 2008, during Lehman’s bankruptcy, 
the funds were in distress. As we want to determine the characteristics of the funds in a normal pre-reform time, 
we do not consider 2008. Second, we do not use the observations in Q1 2010 because the SEC reform was issued 
in February 2010. Although it became binding in May 2010 it is possible that the funds brought their level of 
liquidity and WAL in line with the new requirements before then. Hence, including this period in the analysis 
could distort the results. 
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September 2011). The post-reform period is further divided into calm (February 2011-May 
2011) and crisis (June 2011 – September 2011) periods.11 In our tests, we also consider a calm 
period after the 2011 crisis (September 2013 - December 2013). (See Figure 3 for a graphical 
timeline.) Our final dataset excludes feeder funds (i.e. funds that invest in other funds), internal 
funds, municipal funds and variable annuities,12 which gives us a total of 186 prime funds in 
the post-reform period, with assets totalling $1.3 trillion.  
We perform extensive sanitation checks and use alternative sources to correct data entry 
errors. For instance, the net yield provided on form N-MFP is occasionally incorrectly reported 
by some funds. We obtain the correct values for such funds from Bloomberg. US Treasury bill 
yields are sourced from the FRED database. The final sample we employ in the analysis is an 
unbalanced panel. The number of observations varies depending on the variables included in 
each model and the period of interest. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
As mentioned, the 2010 reform mandated prime money funds to hold at least 30% of total 
portfolio assets in weekly liquid securities and 10% of total portfolio assets in daily liquid 
assets, and to cap the WAL of the portfolio to 120 days. The liquidity floors are intended to 
enable prime funds to comfortably meet redemptions in periods of distress. The WAL ceiling 
protects a fund against interest rate risk and spread risk during high market volatility. To meet 
these constraints, the funds had to make considerable changes to their portfolios. In this section, 
we assess the extent of such changes and how they have influenced the liquidity and risk profile 
of the funds. 
                                                          
11  Large MMF redemptions started in June 2011 and continued until September 2011 (Figure 8). 
12 The funds report their type in item 10 of the N-MFP form. We keep the fund in the data if the fund reports itself 
as ‘prime’ fund. Item 7 reports whether it is a feeder fund. Variable annuities are reported in item 9. We also 
exclude two funds that hold only cash over the period from February 2011 to September 2011. If a fund invests 
more than 95% in municipal securities, it is dropped from the final dataset.  
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We separate the funds in our sample into two groups, constrained and unconstrained. Funds 
are assigned to the constrained group if the weekly liquidity in the final quarter of the before-
reform period (2009Q4) is greater than or equal to the required minimum of 30%. Otherwise, 
they are classified as unconstrained (Figure 4).  We use weekly liquidity for the classification 
because it is the most stringent requirement.13 We have 65 constrained funds and 35 
unconstrained funds in the before-reform period. Figures 5 and 6 present the distributions of 
weekly and daily liquidity respectively for constrained and unconstrained funds before and 
after the reform. As expected, after the reform, constrained funds increase their liquidity, and 
the difference between the two groups becomes less pronounced. Similarly, Figure 7 illustrates 
that constrained funds have higher WAL before the reform. However, after the reform, the 
groups exhibit a similar WAL distribution. We shall now explore the reform-induced portfolio 
changes in these two groups of funds in more detail. 
 
4.1. Portfolio Composition Before and After the 2010 Reform  
We examine the extent of changes in funds’ daily and weekly liquidity and WAL following 
the reform. Daily liquid assets, DLiqft, include US Treasury securities of any maturity and any 
security that can be liquidated within 1 business day (SEC 2010, p.64). Weekly liquid assets, 
WLiqft, include any security that can be liquidated within 5 business days as well as US 
Treasury securities of any maturity and US government agency securities maturing within 60 
days. Our DLiqft and WLiqft are conservative measures of liquidity because they do not account 
for the cash holdings of the funds, as they are unavailable for the sample period. We expect 
DLiqft and WLiqft to increase in constrained funds and WALft to decrease, in response to the 
introduction of liquidity floors and the WALft ceiling. We decompose weekly liquidity 
                                                          
13 Among the funds that already meet the weekly liquidity requirement in the pre-reform period, all but one also 
meet the daily requirement. By contrast, more than 50% of the funds that meet the daily liquidity requirements in 
the pre-reform period do not meet the weekly requirement. Most pre-reform funds meet the WAL requirement. 
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holdings into US Treasury securities (Treasuryft), agency securities that mature within 60 days 
(AgcyLiqft) and liquid assets in the form of short-term securities that can be liquidated within 
5 business days (NonGovLiqft).  
Table 1 reports the fund averages for liquidity and other variables that describe the portfolio 
composition of constrained and unconstrained funds before and after the reform. ‘Before-
reform’ is the period from January 2009 to December 2009, for which only quarterly data is 
available. ‘After-reform’ is the period from February 2011 to May 2011, for which data are 
reported monthly. On average, constrained funds have increased their post-reform weekly 
liquidity by 25.31% of total portfolio assets, most of which has been achieved by larger 
holdings of daily liquid assets (14.11%). The funds have adjusted to higher liquidity by holding 
slightly more Treasury securities (+2.82%) but mostly more short-term non-government 
securities (+22.41%), likely due to their higher yield.  
Before the reform, the average WALft is approximately 86 days, which is less than the 120-
day ceiling imposed by the reform.  This is because, even in the absence of the requirements, 
fund managers had used WAL limits to reduce portfolio risk (SEC 2010). However, there are 
several funds that had a WALft. of longer than 120 days. Following the reform, constrained 
funds have decreased their WALft by approximately 20 days. They have also considerably 
increased their investments (+20.86%) in short-term securities maturing within three months, 
(OA0-3m,ft), which is consistent with the large liquidity gains reported previously. To the same 
effect, constrained MMFs have decreased investments (-7.24%) in securities that mature from 
9 to 13 months, (OA9-13m,ft). 
An increase in liquid assets is expected to translate to lower portfolio yields. Thus, we 
examine the impact of such an increase on the average excess yield of the constrained funds 
after the reform. As expected, the funds earn a lower excess yield (Spread0-3m,ft) on their short-
term investments. In response to such a decrease, it is possible that the funds increased 
12 
 
investment in higher-yield securities, to compensate for the drop in earnings. We test this 
hypothesis and derive evidence that the funds, on average, earn a higher excess yield of 36 bps 
from the investments in longer-dated securities, (Spread9-13m,ft), after the reform. However, the 
overall PortRiskft, calculated as the difference between the gross yield of a fund’s assets and 
the 1-month Treasury bill rate, has fallen (-24.36%). This indicates that the regulatory changes 
have indeed put pressure on the funds’ profitability. To test whether investors have withdrawn 
from prime funds because of the lower yields, we examine the variation in the funds’ net assets 
following the reform. We find that the change is slightly negative but not statistically 
significant.  
We now turn to unconstrained funds. We observe that their weekly liquidity also increases 
but significantly less than for constrained funds. They seem to do so by substituting agency 
securities with short-term non-government securities which, again, is probably motivated by 
the higher yield of the latter. Their increase in liquidity is possibly an attempt to differentiate 
themselves from other riskier prime funds in order to attract risk-averse shareholders who may 
use MMFs for safe cash parking rather than as investment vehicles. Unconstrained funds, on 
average, increase the WALft. However, the average remains relatively lower than that of 
constrained funds. No major differences are found relative to constrained funds on the other 
portfolio characteristics. Column 8 shows the extent to which constrained and unconstrained 
funds have become (dis)similar, after the reform. The overall message is that, relative to the 
before-reform period, the two groups have moved towards similar liquidity levels and risk 
profiles in the after-reform period. To check if there is any heterogeneity within the constrained 
and unconstrained groups of funds in their liquidity adjustments following the reform, we look 
at their pre-post reform quintile differences. Results are reported in Table 2. Interestingly, the 
constrained funds with the lowest weekly liquidity before the reform (first quintile) appear to 
settle to a much higher level of liquidity (49.49% of net assets) than the second and third 
13 
 
quintiles (39.75% and 36.01% respectively) after the reform.14 The same pattern can be seen 
for daily liquidity with a new after-reform level for the first quintile of 27.47% compared to 
19.39% and 18.98% for the second and third quintiles, respectively. It is as if the most 
constrained funds (and, hence, the least in line with the new requirements) ‘over-reacted’ to 
the new rules relative to some of their less constrained peers. Indeed, after the reform, the 
largest liquidity differences between constrained and unconstrained funds are found for the 
second and third quintiles (15.14% and 16.68%, respectively, for weekly liquidity, and 15.60% 
and 17.54% for daily liquidity). 
For the post-reform period, we perform further tests on the mean differences between the 
two groups during the calm and crisis sub-periods. As shown in Table 3, consistent with their 
assumed preference for safety, unconstrained funds keep more liquidity during the crisis period 
than constrained funds do (column 8).  
In summary, we determine that there have been considerable changes in the portfolio 
composition of MMFs following the reform. These changes have resulted in increased liquidity 
and positioned funds to be more resilient in times of heavy outflows. This, however, has 
occurred at the expense of substantially lower portfolio yields.  
 
 
4.2. Impact on the Resilience of MMFs 
In the summer of 2011, the sovereign debt crisis worsened and began to spread from Greece, 
Ireland and Portugal to other Euro area countries. The credit default spreads of Eurozone banks 
increased sharply amidst concerns over their solvency. Consequently, investors started 
withdrawing from MMFs due to their holdings of Eurozone bank assets. Chernenko and 
Sunderam (2014) find that MMFs with greater exposure to Eurozone banks suffered more 
                                                          




outflows. This crisis period provides a setting to test the effectiveness of the 2010 amendments 
in making funds more resilient. As investors’ withdrawals are most prominent for the period 
from June to September 2011 (Figure 8), we employ this crisis period in our counterfactual 
analysis.  
We construct a counterfactual excess liquidity measure, ExWLiqft (ExDLiqft), calculated as 
the lagged weekly (daily) liquidity in excess of average outflows, Outflowsf,crisis̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, during the 
sovereign debt crisis. Before the reform, this variable captures the amount of excess liquidity 
that the funds would have maintained during the crisis had they continued to hold the same 
level of weekly (daily) liquidity prior to the reform. We estimate the following panel fixed-
effects model to conduct the analysis:  
ExLiqft = α + β1 Reformt + β2 Reformt*Conf + β3 Conf + γXft-1 + µf + φt + εft             eq. (1)  
The dependent variable is excess liquidity, whether weekly or daily. We include fund fixed 
effects to control for unobserved fund heterogeneity and time fixed effects to control for time-
varying aggregate risk factors. Reformt is a dummy variable which takes a value of one for the 
after-reform crisis (June 2011-September 2011) and zero for the period before the reform 
(January 2009-December 2009). Conf is a dummy variable which identifies constrained funds. 
Xft-1 is a vector of fund-level control variables which includes the standard deviation of net 
inflows (FlowVolft-1), portfolio risk (PortRiskft-1) and expected outflows and inflows 
(ExpOutflowsft-1, ExpInflowsft-1). The variable definitions are reported in Appendix A.1. As 
ExpOutflowsft-1 and ExpInflowsft-1 are estimated, our results could suffer from generated 
regressor bias (Pagan 1984). We address this concern by employing bootstrapped standard 
errors. Table 4 presents our results. The analysis is conducted for a fixed sample of 100 funds 
for which we have data before as well as after the reform. Panel A contains the results for 
weekly excess liquidity and Panel B presents those for daily excess liquidity. Following the 
reform, and while controlling for other factors that may influence the amount of liquidity held 
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by the fund, constrained funds have increased their weekly excess liquidity by a substantial 
29% of total portfolio assets (model 1). However, the new level is still statistically significantly 
lower, (-21% of total portfolio assets), than the excess liquidity held by unconstrained funds 
post-reform (model 3). These results confirm that the money fund industry has become more 
resilient to sustained pressure from high redemptions, relative to its pre-reform condition. In 
model 3, we find that larger funds tend to hold lower levels of weekly excess liquidity. This 
may be because their wider reach among investors enables them to diversify the risk of 
redemptions with a higher number of subscriptions. In Panel B, we repeat the analysis for daily 
excess liquidity. The results are broadly confirmed. However, the Wald tests show that 
constrained funds appear to have adjusted their daily liquidity to such an extent that it is no 
longer statistically significantly different from that of unconstrained funds after the reform.  
We verify whether our findings are robust to the definitions of constrained and 
unconstrained funds. Figure 4 indicates that some funds are close to the 30% weekly liquidity 
threshold we have used to define the two types of funds. Arguably, borderline cases may not 
be considered to be fully representative of either of the two groups. We therefore eliminate all 
the borderline funds that lie in the plus or minus 2% weekly liquidity band around the threshold. 
Unreported results confirm our previous conclusions.15  
Table 5 presents the distribution of counterfactual excess liquidity across all funds before 
and after the reform. ExWLiqft and ExDLiqft are defined as before. ExWLiq_WCft 
(ExDLiq_WCft) is the worst-case excess weekly (daily) liquidity calculated as the difference 
between lagged weekly (daily) liquidity and the highest level of monthly net outflows, 
Outflowsf,crisis, during the sovereign debt crisis (June 2011-September 2011). Panel A shows 
the distribution of variables for constrained funds. Before the reform, 8% of fund-month 
observations would have had negative excess weekly liquidity had the sovereign debt crisis 
                                                          
15 Results are available from the authors on request. 
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average losses materialised. For the counterfactual excess daily liquidity, 12% of fund-month 
observations are negative. These results show that a non-negligible proportion of funds would 
have experienced a shortfall in liquidity had a sovereign crisis-type of event occurred before 
the reform period. When we consider the worst-case scenario, the proportion of fund-months 
with liquidity shortages rises substantially to 18% and 29% for weekly and daily liquidity 
respectively. For unconstrained funds (Panel B), as expected, liquidity shortages are markedly 
more limited.  
After the reform, the situation improves dramatically, with weekly liquidity shortages going 
to zero even in the worst-case scenario, and daily liquidity shortages affecting only a small 
proportion of fund-month observations. In Table 5, we also report the proportions of fund-
months where we observe a breach of the minimum liquidity requirements after the reform. 
We see that in the worst-case scenario, weekly and daily liquidity requirements are breached 
in 36% and 27% of the cases, respectively, for constrained funds, and 24% and 18% of the 
cases for unconstrained funds. These results indicate that although liquidity in the sector has 
improved and funds have become more resilient following the reform, the sovereign debt crisis 
put pressure on the liquidity reserves of a non-trivial proportion of funds.  
We have also examined actual excess liquidity after the reform, as opposed to the 
counterfactual levels. Unreported results reveal a lower but still substantial number of funds 
that did not meet minimum liquidity requirements, and few of them experienced a liquidity 
shortfall. Specifically, 15% and 11% of constrained fund-months are below minimum weekly 
and daily requirements, which correspond to 22 and 17 funds respectively. By constrast, only 
5% and 7% of the unconstrained fund-months were below the weekly and daily requirements, 
respectively, totalling five funds in both cases. One per cent of the constrained fund-months 




4.3. Factors Influencing Liquidity Holdings 
Following the 2010 reform, MMF management and boards of directors have been required 
to hold sufficiently liquid securities to meet foreseeable redemptions. This is called the ‘know 
your investors’ rule. Depending on the volatility of shareholder redemptions, a fund may need 
to hold greater liquidity than that required by the daily and weekly minimum levels mandated 
by the 2010 reform. Consistent with this requirement, and as a precautionary measure to lower 
the likelihood of falling below the regulatory minimum, most funds in our sample hold more 
liquidity than the regulatory minimum.  
In this section, we assess the factors that influence a fund’s liquidity decisions by using the 
following monthly fixed-effects model, 
Liqft = α  +β1 ExpOutflowsft-1 + β2 ExpOutflowsft-1*Crisist + β3ExpInflowsft-1 + 
+ β4ExpInflowsft-1*Crisist + β5PortRiskft-1 + β6PortRiskft-1*Crisist + β7FlowVolft-1 
+β8FlowVolft-1*Crisist + γXft-1 + µf  + φt + εft      eq. (2) 
 
The dependent variable is weekly or daily liquidity, measured as before. The explanatory 
variables include expected outflows (ExpOutflowsft), obtained from an AR(1) model on past 
inflows and defined as the negative value of predicted inflows when predicted inflows are 
negative, and zero otherwise. We also employ expected inflows (ExpInflowsft), which are equal 
to predicted inflows when they are positive and zero otherwise. We separate expected outflows 
and expected inflows to account for a possible asymmetry in the fund’s liquidity response. In 
this sense, we depart from the literature in which a historical measure, flow volatility, is often 
used to analyze the reaction of a fund to the redemption behaviour of its investors (Gallagher 
et al. 2015 and Witmer 2018). Portfolio risk (PortRiskft) is defined as a fund’s gross yield in 
excess of the 1-month Treasury bill rate. Flow volatility (FlowVolft) is the 7-day standard 
deviation of a fund’s inflows and captures the uncertainty in the behaviour of a fund’s 
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shareholders. Xft is a vector of control variables that includes the proportion of a fund’s net 
assets held by institutional shareholders (InstShareft) and the constrained fund dummy (Conf).  
As market distress may influence MMFs’ liquidity (Jank and Wedow 2015, Jacklin and 
Bhattacharya 1988), we interact a crisis dummy with the main explanatory variables. The 
dummy equals one for the crisis period (June 2011 -September 2011) and zero for the post-
crisis calm period between September 2013 and December 2013. We examine a post-crisis 
calm period non-adjacent to the crisis period because we need several months of data to 
compute portfolio flow volatility (FlowVolft) and want to avoid any overlap between the two 
periods when constructing explanatory variables. 
After the reform, our sample includes 186 funds as compared to 100 funds before the reform. 
The 86 funds for which we have no pre-reform data are classified as constrained or 
unconstrained on the basis of the distance of their weekly liquidity from the average weekly 
liquidity of pre-reform constrained and unconstrained funds (see Appendix A.1 for detailed 
calculations). In addition, because we estimate the variables ExpOutflowsft and ExpInflowsft 
by using a regression, we calculate bootstrapped standard errors to alleviate second-stage 
regression bias concerns. Table 6 reports our results. Panel A presents the results for weekly 
liquidity and Panel B for daily liquidity. We estimate eq. (2) first by using fund fixed effects 
only (model 1) and then add time fixed effects (model 2). In model 3, we add the constrained 
fund dummy but exclude fund fixed effects to avoid near multicollinearity between fund fixed 
effects and the dummy.16 Panel A shows that expected outflows do not seem to induce a 
liquidity response from the funds in the calm period. By contrast, during the crisis, funds with 
higher expected outflows increase their weekly liquidity levels. This demonstrates that funds 
with higher redemption risk have a more cautious attitude in stressful times and respond by 
                                                          
16 If we estimate the panel regression in its demeaned form (‘within’ estimator), all time invariant dummies, 
such as the constrained fund dummy, would be eliminated. Even if we retain the model in its original form and 
include fund fixed effects and the constrained fund dummy, the fund fixed effects would closely replicate the 
dummy because of the short time series dimension of the panel, thus leading to near multicollinearity. 
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actively adjusting their liquidity levels. This is in line with Witmer (2018) who finds that 
external prime funds (i.e. those with retail or institutional shareholders) hold more liquidity 
than do internal prime funds (i.e. those for which the shareholders are the funds owned by the 
same sponsor), because the former are more vulnerable to runs. While expected outflows have 
a significant impact on fund liquidity during crisis periods, the coefficient of expected inflows 
is not statistically significant in any of our specifications. This asymmetric response is plausible 
as inflows are less likely than outflows to put pressure on a fund to change its portfolio 
composition. 
Next, we see that during normal times, the coefficient of PortRiskft is negative in all 
regressions. This suggests a mechanical relationship between portfolio risk and liquidity, 
because assets with higher yield are typically less liquid. However, during the crisis, in the full 
model (model 3), funds with higher portfolio risk exhibit a statistically significant increase in 
their liquidity, relative to the calm period. The result indicates that riskier funds become more 
prudent when market conditions deteriorate, and build a liquidity buffer to absorb redemptions. 
The coefficient of Crisist is positive and highly significant (model 3). This is plausible because 
during distress a fund must increase liquidity to service redemptions. Consistent with our 
previous results, constrained funds are relatively less liquid in normal as well as in crisis times.  
     Panel B presents the results for daily liquidity. Overall, they are in line with those for weekly 
liquidity. However, different from previous results, in model 6, expected outflows for the calm 
period have a negative but weakly significant effect on daily liquidity. The implication is that 
funds may not be overly concerned about replenishing their very short-term liquidity following 
redemptions if market conditions are stable. By contrast, the influence of expected outflows on 
daily liquidity during crisis periods is positive and highly significant, as for weekly liquidity. 
The Wald test results confirm the above inference.  
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     Overall, we find that MMFs respond to the behaviour of their investors by adjusting their 
weekly and daily liquidity, especially in times of crisis. Our findings are broadly confirmed 
when we introduce a lagged dependent variable. We estimate the resulting dynamic panel with 
two-step system generalized method of moments (GMM). System GMM controls for fixed 
effects by using a system of two equations, each of which has its own instruments. The first 
equation is in levels and is instrumented with lagged differences of the explanatory variables. 
The second equation is in first differences and is instrumented with lagged levels of the 
explanatory variables. This method of addressing endogeneity allows assessing time-invariant 
binary variables, which are removed in within-group estimators. We assess the validity of the 
instruments by using Hansen J statistic. The Hansen J test is based on the null hypothesis that 
the instruments are not correlated with the error process which, if rejected, would indicate that 
the instruments are invalid and the estimates inconsistent. We test for first-order autocorrelation 
and second-order autocorrelation in residuals by using the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test 
and use robust standard errors corrected according to Windmeijer (2005). The results are 
reported in Appendix A.2, Panel A where we use, as in our original regressions, the portfolio 
yield spread as a measure of risk (PortRiskft). One caveat of a yield-based measure of credit 
risk is that it is backward looking. Therefore, we test the robustness of our ‘know your investor’ 
analysis by also employing a forward-looking measure, that is, the expected loss at maturity 
(ELMft) discussed by Collins and Gallagher (2016). The findings are shown in Appendix A.2 
Panel B. Using both measures of portfolio uncertainty, broadly confirms our previous main 
results, despite some differences. As before, we observe a positive liquidity response when 
funds expect outflows in a crisis. As for portfolio risk, both PortRisk and ELM are negatively 
related to weekly and daily liquidity in calm periods. The results are statistically significant 
except for daily liquidity with ELM specification (model 4). But, such negative relationship 
between portfolio risk and liquidity may be less pronounced in a crisis period, because funds 
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adopt more defensive portfolio decisions to counter potential outflows. This is evidenced by 
the positive coefficients of PortRiskft-1*Crisist and ELMft-1*Crisist. However, the crisis effects 
for these two risk measures do not produce unambiguously statistically significant results for 
weekly or daily liquidity. In contrast to the static model in Table 6, the volatility of net inflows 
in a crisis (FlowVolft-1*Crisist) is statistically significantly positively related to daily liquidity 
(models 2 and 4). Therefore, funds appear to increase their very short-term liquidity if they 
expect greater uncertainty in investors’ behaviour which, again, is consistent with a ‘know your 
investor’ response by the funds. In addition, expected inflows also become significantly 
positively related to daily liquidity in a crisis (ExpInflowsft-1*Crisist in models 2 and 4). The 
result may be plausible with heightened market uncertainty as funds are likely to keep inflows 
in a highly liquid forms. Wald tests confirm this positive relationship but they are statistically 
significant only for the ELMft specification (model 4), which also yields a mild significantly 
positive outcome for weekly liquidity (model 3). Finally, the crisis dummy for daily liquidity 
turns negative and significant, despite being positive and significant in the static model. This 
may indicate that even though funds may adjust to investors’ behaviour, they may experience 
a decline in their very short-term liquidity in a crisis to meet larger redemptions. 
 
4.4. Investor Response and Liquidity   
In this section, we examine the redemption behaviour of MMF shareholders in response to 
the level of fund liquidity. We investigate whether higher liquidity signals health, thereby 
boosting investor confidence in a fund and providing protection against panic-driven runs. The 
negative effects of outflows on the remaining investors in a fund is well documented in the 
literature (e.g. Edelen 1999, Nanda et al. 2000). These negative effects generate a first-mover 
advantage, ultimately leading to self-fulfilling runs. Jank and Wedow (2015), with a sample of 
German money funds, show that the funds with higher liquidity have lower outflows in bad 
times, but also experience lower inflows during good times. In other words, higher liquidity, 
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which may result in lower yields, may or may not be attractive to investors depending on 
market conditions. However, Jank and Wedow (2015) do not differentiate between low- and 
high-risk funds. It is possible that the level of liquid holdings may be less effective in curbing 
outflows in a crisis when a fund’s portfolio is perceived to be high risk. We extend Jank and 
Wedow’s analysis by studying the role of fund liquidity in tandem with the level of credit risk 
in the funds. We estimate the following monthly panel fixed-effects regression, 
NetInflowsft = α   + β1 EZBft-1 + β2 EZBft-1 * Crisist + β3 WLiqft-1  
+ β4 WLiqft-1* Crisist + β5 Low EZBft * WLiqft-1 * Crisist  
+ β6 High EZBft * WLiqft-1 * Crisist + γXft-1 + µf + φt + εft      eq. (3) 
 
The dependent variable across all regressions is NetInflowsft. We use Eurozone bank exposure, 
EZB, as a measure of portfolio credit risk. As in Chernenko and Sunderam (2014), we define 
EZB as the proportion of the total assets of a fund that was invested in the Eurozone banks 
included in the European Banking Authority’s 2011 stress tests. Funds hold, on average, 16% 
of their total assets in Eurozone banks during the calm period, with the maximum holding being 
as high as 40% (Table 6). For the crisis period, however, we observe an industry-wide drop in 
Eurozone bank investments. Low EZBft and High EZBft are dummies that identify the lowest 
and highest EZBft terciles, respectively. WLiqft-1 and Crisist are defined as before. µf  represents 
fund fixed effects, and φt  denotes time fixed effects. Xft includes control variables that could 
influence the behaviour of a fund’s shareholders. These are: (i) NetYieldft which is the yield 
earned by a fund’s shareholders and is calculated as the value-weighted average of the 7-day 
net yields of the fund’s share classes as reported on the N-MFP form; (ii) ERatioft, the expense 
ratio of a fund, calculated as the difference between its gross and net yields; and (iii) InstShareft, 
WALft, Conf and Crisist which are defined as before. Standard errors are clustered at the fund 
level. The sample includes a calm period (February 2011-May 2011) and the crisis period (June 
2011- September 2011). 
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Table 8 lists the results of using weekly liquidity (Panel A), daily liquidity (Panel B), and 
the aforementioned controls, to explain net inflows. In line with Chernenko and Sunderam 
(2014), we find that the funds with higher exposure to Eurozone banks, attract more investors 
in the calm period because such exposure is more likely to generate higher yields. But, in the 
crisis period the coefficient of EZBft becomes negative and highly significant. This shows that 
funds with higher credit risk consistently face higher redemption pressure when markets are 
unstable.  
The coefficients of weekly and daily liquidity (WLiqft and DLiqft) are negative, though not 
statistically significant or only mildly so, during the calm period, depending on the model 
specification. In other words, lower-yield liquid assets do not attract investors when markets 
are stable. However, for the crisis period, the coefficients of weekly and daily liquidity (WLiqft-
1*Crisist and DLiqft-1*Crisist) turn positive and are statistically significant in the full models 
(models 3 and 6). This suggests that investors may consider a fund’s liquid assets more 
desirable in a crisis than in a calm period. The attractiveness of liquid assets may be related to 
their lower risk and the fact that they may equip a fund more effectively for meeting 
redemptions. This finding is in line with Jank and Wedow (2015) and Witmer (2018).  
The above does not clarify whether the positive influence of liquid assets on inflows in a 
crisis applies regardless of a fund’s risk. If a fund is perceived as being highly risky, its liquidity 
levels may not help to prevent redemptions. This is what we find when we isolate the influence 
of the liquidity variables during the crisis for funds with high exposures to Eurozone banks. 
The coefficient of the term High EZBft-1* Liqft-1* Crisist is negative and significant for both 
weekly and daily liquidity across all specifications. In addition, the Wald test results reaffirm 
that liquidity is not positively related to inflows in a crisis, as the term Liqft-
1*(1+Crisist*(1+High EZBft-1)) is negative and not statistically significant across all 
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specifications (models 1 to 6). The implication is that funds are not protected against runs by 
their liquidity when they are invested in high-risk assets.  
This contrasts with Witmer (2018), who finds that riskier funds with higher daily and 
overnight liquidity have lower redemptions. To determine whether our results are influenced 
by the observation period and choice of explanatory variables, we estimate eq. (3) by using a 
longer sample period (January 2011-April 2015) and add the covariates used by Witmer (2018). 
The results are presented in Appendix A.3. Our previous inference about the impact of liquidity 
on risky funds in a crisis is confirmed. In addition, the larger sample increases the statistical 
significance of the regression coefficients and, ultimately, strengthens our conclusions. 
Surprisingly, the tests based on the extended sample in Table A.3 show that a fund’s Eurozone 
exposures in the calm and crisis periods (EZBft-1 and EZBft-1*Crisist) are no longer significant. 
This may be because the extended sample is dominated by the post-crisis period, in which 
Eurozone banks may have lost their attractiveness as an investment. This renders investors’ 
inflows insensitive to EZBft exposure in the extended calm period. A further consequence is 
that the investors’ perceptions about the desirability of EZBft exposure would be more similar 
in the extended calm period and crisis period; this tallies with the lack of significance of the 
EZBft-1*Crisist variable.  
Consistent with the performance-flow relationship documented in the literature,17 in some 
models we observe that a fund receives higher inflows if it pays higher yields (NetYieldft-1). 
However, during the crisis, higher-yield funds do not seem to attract higher inflows. Indeed, 
Wald tests show that the impact of the net yield on inflows is not significant in a crisis (see the 
term NetYieldft-1(1+Crisist) in both Table 8 and A.3). Our tests in Table A.3 further indicate 
that the proportion of institutional investors among a fund’s shareholders is negative and highly 
                                                          
17 See, for instance, Chernenko and Sunderam (2014), Christoffersen (2001), Christoffersen and Musto (2002), 
Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2013), Jank and Wedow (2015) and Collins and Gallagher (2016). 
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significant in a crisis (Institutional_Witft-1*Crisist)
18. This implies that institutional investors 
may be more reactive to negative news than retail investors, as observed in previous studies 
(Cherneneko and Sunderam 2014, Gallagher et al. 2015).  
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper explores the impact of new liquidity requirements designed to improve the 
stability of MMFs. We show that these requirements have prompted substantial changes in the 
composition of the funds’ portfolios. As expected, portfolio liquidity has increased while asset 
maturity has declined. This has led to a safer asset mix and equipped funds to withstand high 
redemption pressure. This finding is corroborated by our counterfactual analysis that examines 
what would have happened if the funds had maintained the same level of liquidity that they 
had before the reform. We observe that during the sovereign debt crisis, most MMFs met 
redemption pressure and had excess liquidity left unused. However, we also find that a non-
trivial proportion of funds breached their minimum liquidity requirements to meet outflows. 
Therefore, given that the liquidity shocks during the sovereign debt crisis were mild relative to 
the post-Lehman events in 2008, whether MMFs could withstand harsh crisis scenarios remains 
an open question.  
We also see that MMFs seem to be relatively acquainted with the redemption behaviour of 
their shareholder base and keep higher liquidity when expecting higher redemption pressure.  
However, investors’ withdrawals do not appear to be influenced by the fund liquidity in a crisis 
if the fund is risky. This suggests that investors’ behaviour may be driven more by their 
concerns about the preservation of capital rather than the funds’ ability to meet redemptions.  
                                                          
18 In Table A.3 we identify institutional funds as those with a minimal investment of $100,000, as in Witmer 
(2018). By contrast, in Table 7 we follow the Chernenko and Sunderam (2014)’s definition which involves 
using a $1 million threshold. 
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Future research could investigate in greater detail the limitations of higher liquidity in 
financial markets. Because MMFs are required to hold more liquid assets, banks and 
corporation will face higher borrowing costs.19 This, combined with new SEC reforms that 
have made prime MMFs less attractive to investors due to, for example, the introduction of 
discretionary redemption suspensions, may have severe consequences regarding the 
availability of affordable short-term credit to the private sector. The wider implications of these 

















                                                          
19 See ‘US money market fund reform: an explainer. New rules are already impacting the $2.7tn industry’, 
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Figure 1: Total Financial Assets: US Data 
This figure shows the total financial assets of US MMFs and the US banks. Banks include the total financial 
assets of private depository institutions (source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve: Financial Accounts 





















































































































































Figure 2: Commercial Paper Holdings: US Data 
This figure shows the amount of commercial paper held by various types of institutions. ‘Other shadow banks’ 
include the total financial assets of asset-backed securities issuers, securities brokers and dealers, finance 
companies, government sponsored enterprises (GSE) and agencies and GSE-backed mortgage pools. ‘Banks’ 
include the total financial assets of private depository institutions. ‘Other’ includes non-profits, retirement and 
pension funds, life insurance companies and mutual funds. The ‘rest of the world’ represents the holdings of non-
US investors (source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve: Financial Accounts of the United States at 





















































































































Figure 3: Timeline 
This figure illustrates the various time periods used in the analysis. The reform period starts from the 
announcement of the SEC reform in February 2010 to their full implementation in November 2010. The after-
























































Figure 4: Scatterplot of Weekly Liquidity: Constrained and Unconstrained Funds  
This figure presents the scatterplot of funds’ weekly liquidity (WLiqft) in the final quarter of the before-reform 
period, 2009Q4. WLiqft represents the weekly liquid assets of a fund as a percentage of its total portfolio. It 
includes any security that matures or has a demand feature that allows it to be converted to cash within 5 business 
days, US government agency securities that mature within 60 days, and US Treasury securities of any maturity. 
The horizontal solid red line represents the 30% regulatory threshold of weekly liquidity, while the dotted blue 
lines are the ± 2% bands around the regulatory threshold. Funds with weekly liquidity more than or equal to 30% 
are classified as unconstrained funds and are represented by navy blue dots, whereas funds with less than 30% 
weekly liquidity are classified as constrained funds and are represented by red dots (source: N-Q, N-CSR, and N-
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Figure 5: Distribution of Weekly Liquidity Before and After the 2010 Reform 
This figure shows box-and-whisker plots of weekly liquidity (WLiqft) across funds in each quarter of the before-
reform period (January 2009–December2009), and in each month of a subsample (February 2011 – September 
2011) of the after-reform period. WLiqft represents the weekly liquid assets of a fund as a percentage of its total 
portfolio. It includes any security that matures or has a demand feature that allows it to be converted to cash within 
5 business days, US government agency securities that mature within 60 days, and US Treasury securities of any 
maturity. Constrained funds are the funds that held less than 30% weekly liquidity before the reform in 2009Q4. 
Unconstrained funds are funds that held more than or equal to 30% weekly liquidity before the reform in 2009Q4. 
The rectangles show the interquartile range (IQR), which represent the 25th to 75th percentiles, and the horizontal 
line in the middle of the rectangles is the median. The whiskers below and above the rectangles indicate the lowest 
and highest weekly liquidity values in the data, respectively, that are not outliers. Outliers are any weekly liquidity 
values below Q1 − 1.5 * IQR or above Q3 + 1.5 * IQR. Observations falling outside this range are outliers, 


























Figure 6: Distribution of Daily Liquidity Before and After the 2010 Reform 
This figure shows box-and-whisker plots of daily liquidity (DLiqft) across funds in each quarter of the before-
reform period (January 2009–December 2009), and in each month of a subsample (February 2011– September 
2011) of the after-reform period. DLiqft represents the daily liquid assets of a fund as a percentage of its total 
portfolio assets. It includes any security that matures or has a demand feature that allows it to be converted to cash 
within 1 business day and US Treasury securities of any maturity. Constrained funds are funds that held less than 
30% weekly liquidity before the reform in 2009Q4. Unconstrained funds are funds that held more than or equal 
to 30% weekly liquidity before the reform in 2009Q4. The rectangles show the interquartile range (IQR), which 
represents the 25th to 75th percentiles, and the horizontal line in the middle of the rectangles is the median. The 
whiskers below and above the rectangles indicate the lowest and highest daily liquidity values in the data, 
respectively, that are not outliers. Outliers are any daily liquidity values below Q1 − 1.5 * IQR or above Q3 + 1.5 
* IQR. Observations falling outside this range are outliers, denoted with a dot (source: N-Q, N-CSR, N-CSRS and 




















Figure 7: Distribution of Weighted Average Life (WAL) Before and After the 2010 
Reform 
This figure shows box-and-whisker plots of WALft across funds in each quarter of the before-reform period 
(January 2009–December 2009), and in each month of a subsample (February 2011– September 2011) of the 
after-reform period. WALft is the weighted average life calculated as the dollar-weighted average maturity of a 
fund's portfolio holdings without regard to interest rate reset dates. Constrained funds are funds that held less than 
30% weekly liquidity before the reform in 2009Q4. Unconstrained funds are the funds that held more than or 
equal to 30% weekly liquidity before the reform in 2009Q4. The rectangles show the interquartile range (IQR), 
which represents the 25th to 75th percentiles, and the horizontal line in the middle of the rectangles is the median. 
The whiskers below and above the rectangles indicate the lowest and highest WAL values in the data, respectively, 
that are not outliers. Outliers are any WAL values below Q1 − 1.5 * IQR or above Q3 + 1.5 * IQR.. Observations 
falling outside this range are outliers, denoted with a dot (source: N-Q, N-CSR, N-CSRS and N-MFP forms data, 































Figure 8: Aggregate Net Inflows of US MMFs 
This figure shows the aggregate net inflows of US MMFs during the sovereign debt crisis (June 2011-September 
2011) and the two calm periods used in this paper (February 2011-May 2011 and September 2013-December 
2013). Aggregate net inflows is the sum of MMF net inflows (in $) for each month. Net inflows in dollars are 
calculated as the difference between fund-level subscriptions and redemptions (source: N-MFP form data, authors’ 







Table 1. Portfolio Characteristics Before and After the 2010 Reform  
 Constrained Funds (C) Unconstrained Funds (U) “C-U” 
 BR AR Diff BR AR Diff BR AR Diff 
Mean (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
WLiqft % 16.51*** 41.81*** 25.31*** 40.11*** 44.10*** 3.990** -23.60*** -2.283 21.32*** 
DLiqft % 10.48*** 24.60*** 14.11*** 24.91*** 28.32*** 3.415 -14.43*** -3.730 10.70*** 
Treasuryft % 1.975*** 4.791*** 2.82*** 3.503*** 3.746*** 0.243 -1.528* 1.046 2.574* 
AgcyLiqft % 2.751*** 2.662*** -0.0895 12.11*** 5.314*** -6.792*** -9.355*** -2.652*** 6.703*** 
NonGovLiqft % 11.80*** 34.21*** 22.41*** 24.34*** 34.26*** 9.927*** -12.54*** -0.0518 12.48*** 
WALft (days) 85.66*** 65.50*** -20.16** 48.90*** 61.55*** 12.65** 36.76*** 3.948 -32.82*** 
OA0-3m,ft % 66.20*** 87.05*** 20.86*** 81.73*** 87.99*** 6.260*** -15.53*** -0.938 14.60*** 
OA9-13m,ft % 9.577*** 2.337*** -7.239*** 8.906** 3.050*** -5.856 0.671 -0.712* -1.383 
Spread0-3m,ft (bp) 41.52*** 20.84*** -20.68*** 37.43*** 20.75*** -16.68*** 4.092 0.0852 -4.007 
Spread9-13m,ft (bp) 52.00*** 87.92*** 35.93* 40.91*** 72.89*** 31.98 11.08 15.03 3.949 
PortRiskft (bp) 51.75*** 27.39*** -24.36*** 47.01*** 26.64*** -20.36*** 4.742 0.746 -3.997 
NetAssetsft ($ bn) 5.347*** 5.170*** -0.177 3.917*** 4.700*** 0.783 1.430 0.470 -0.960 
          
No of funds 65 65 65 35 35 35 100 100 100 
This table presents the averages of variables for the before-reform period (BR; from January 2009-December 2009, with quarterly reported data compiled from the 
N-Q, N-CSRS and N-CSR forms filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)), and for the after-reform period (AR; from February 2011-May 2011, 
with monthly data compiled from the N-MFP forms filed with the SEC). Constrained funds are funds that held less than 30% weekly liquidity before the reform in 
2009Q4. Unconstrained funds are funds that held more than or equal to 30% weekly liquidity before the reform in 2009Q4. “C-U” represents the difference between 
the constrained and unconstrained group. Diff is the difference between ‘AR’ and ‘BR’ variables. WLiqft represents the weekly liquid assets of a fund as a percentage 
of its total portfolio of securities. It includes (1) any security that matures or has a demand feature that allows it to be converted to cash within 5 business days, 
NonGovLiqft; (2) US government agency securities that matures within 60 days, AgcyLiqft; (3) US Treasury securities of any maturity, Treasuryft; DLiqft represents 
daily liquid assets of a fund as a percentage of its total portfolio of securities. It includes any security that matures or has a demand feature that allows it to be 
converted to cash within 1 business day and US Treasury securities of any maturity. WALft is the weighted average life calculated as the dollar-weighted average 
maturity of a fund's portfolio holdings without regard to interest rate reset dates. OA0-3m,ft and OA9-13m,ft measure the aggregate investment weight of securities in a 
fund’s portfolio with maturity up to 3 months and in the 9-13 month range, respectively. Spread0-3m,ft measures the difference between the value-weighted issuer 
yield of securities with maturity up to 3 months, and the 3-month Treasury bill. Spread9-13m,ft   measures the difference between the value-weighted issuer yield of 
securities with maturity within 9-13 months and the 12-month Treasury bill. PortRiskft measures the difference between the gross yield of the fund portfolio and 
the 1-month Treasury bill. NetAssetsft is the value of net assets reported on monthly and quarterly forms and is equal to the total value of a fund’s securities plus 




Table 2. Quintile Differences in Weekly and Daily Liquidity Before and After the Reform 
 
 Constrained Funds (C) Unconstrained Funds (U) “C-U” 
 Before After Diff Before After Diff Before After Diff 
Mean of WLiqft  by quintile (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Quintile 1 5.237*** 49.49*** 44.25*** 32.04*** 51.13*** 19.09*** -26.80*** -1.642 25.16*** 
Quintile 2 12.05*** 39.75*** 27.70*** 36.41*** 54.89*** 18.49*** -24.35*** -15.14*** 9.213*** 
Quintile 3 17.94*** 36.01*** 18.07*** 40.39*** 52.69*** 12.30*** -22.45*** -16.68*** 5.770 
Quintile 4 21.70*** 54.94*** 33.24*** 41.87*** 50.18*** 8.310*** -20.17*** 4.761 24.93*** 
Quintile 5 24.25*** 48.31*** 24.06*** 59.85*** 54.85*** -5.002 -35.60*** -6.539 29.06*** 
          
No of funds 65 65 65 35 35 35 100 100 100 
 
 Constrained Funds (C) Unconstrained Funds (U) “C-U” 
 Before After Diff Before After Diff Before After Diff 
Mean of DLiqft  by quintile (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Quintile 1 3.188*** 27.47*** 24.28*** 20.73*** 36.28*** 15.55*** -17.55*** -8.808** 8.737* 
Quintile 2 6.635*** 19.39*** 12.75*** 24.93*** 34.99*** 10.06** -18.30*** -15.60*** 2.698 
Quintile 3 11.60*** 18.98*** 7.387*** 28.55*** 36.52*** 7.973 -16.95*** -17.54*** -0.586 
Quintile 4 15.89*** 35.77*** 19.88*** 28.74*** 34.03*** 5.291 -12.85*** 1.745 14.59** 
Quintile 5 16.92*** 36.64*** 19.72*** 37.05*** 29.27*** -7.779 -20.13*** 7.366 27.50*** 
          
No of funds 65 65 65 35 35 35 100 100 100 
The table presents quintile differences for weekly and daily liquidity before the reform (January 2009-December 2009) and after the reform (February 2011-May 
2011). Constrained funds are funds that held less than 30% average weekly liquidity before the reform.“C-U” is the difference between the constrained and 
unconstrained funds. Diff is the difference between after- and before-reform variables. WLiqft (DLiqft) represents the weekly (daily) liquid assets of a fund as a 









Table 3. MMF Liquidity in Calm and Crisis Periods (After the Reform) 
 Constrained Funds (C) Unconstrained Funds (U) “C-U” 
 Calm Crisis Diff Calm Crisis Diff Calm Crisis Diff 
Mean (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
WLiqft (%) 41.81*** 45.68*** 3.863* 44.10*** 52.55*** 8.451*** -2.283 -6.871** -4.588 
DLiqft (%) 24.60*** 27.15*** 2.553 28.32*** 33.29*** 4.965 -3.730 -6.141** -2.411 
WALft (days) 65.52*** 58.67*** -6.850* 61.60*** 55.47*** -6.127 3.923 3.200 -0.723 
No of funds 65 65 65 35 35 35 100 100 100 
This table presents the averages of the liquidity and weighted average life variables, which are divided into the calm period (February 2011-May 2011) and crisis 
period (June 2011-September 2011). Constrained funds are funds that held less than 30% weekly liquidity before the reform in 2009Q4. Unconstrained funds are 
funds that held more than or equal to 30% weekly liquidity before the reform in 2009Q4. “C-U” represents the difference between the constrained and unconstrained 
group. Diff is the difference between crisis and calm periods. WLiqft represents the weekly liquid assets of a fund as a percentage of its total portfolio of securities. 
It includes (1) any security that matures or has a demand feature that allows it to be converted to cash within 5 business days. DLiqft represents the daily liquid 
assets of a fund as a percentage of its total portfolio of securities. It includes any security that matures or has a demand feature that allows it to be converted to cash 
within 1 business day and US Treasury securities of any maturity.  WALft is the weighted average life calculated as the dollar-weighted average maturity of a fund's 








Table 4. Impact of the Reform on Counterfactual Crisis-Level Excess Liquidity 
 Panel A: Weekly Excess Liquidity Panel B: Daily Excess Liquidity 
DepVar:  ExWLiqft   ExDLiqft  
 “C” “U” “C+U” “C” “U” “C+U” 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Reformt 29.026*** 10.85 10.89** 18.157*** 5.845 7.101 
 (4.234) (9.849) (4.802) (3.185) (8.416) (5.190) 
Reformt* Conf   15.94***   9.547* 
   (3.704)   (4.915) 
Conf   -21.01***   -13.43*** 
   (3.401)   (4.192) 
ExpOutflowsft-1 0.172 -0.119 0.149 -0.169 -0.0501 0.0601 
 (0.354) (0.410) (0.186) (0.262) (0.335) (0.218) 
PortRiskft-1 -0.052 -0.0826 -0.0764* 0.027 -0.0811 -0.0365 
 (0.077) (0.143) (0.0417) (0.058) (0.126) (0.0491) 
FlowVolft-1 0.226* 0.106 0.115 0.135 0.102 0.0569 
 (0.120) (0.184) (0.0829) (0.116) (0.194) (0.0639) 
ExpInflowsft-1 -0.242 0.216 -0.193 -0.221 0.352 -0.0570 
 (0.504) (0.872) (0.377) (0.373) (0.791) (0.358) 
Sizeft-1   -1.739**   -0.637 
   (0.688)   (0.773) 
       
Constant 15.108*** 39.71*** 75.51*** 5.880 24.08** 36.13** 
 (5.648) (11.90) (15.83) (4.190) (10.30) (17.25) 
       
Fund Fixed Effects Y Y N Y Y N 
Time Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Adjusted R2 0.630 0.201 0.509 0.455 0.0869 0.331 
Observations 337 191 516 337 191 516 
Wald Test:       
Conf (1+ Reformt)   -5.07**   -3.88 
This table presents the results of panel regressions that measure the impact of the reform on counter-factual crisis level 
excess liquidity. The sample period includes the before-reform period (January 2009-December 2009) and the after-
reform crisis period (June 2011-September 2011). In Panel A, the dependent variable is excess weekly liquidity, 
ExWLiqft, which is calculated as lagged weekly liquidity, WLiqft-1 in excess of the average net outflows a fund 
experiences during the sovereign debt crisis, Outflowsf,crisis̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  . In Panel B, the dependent variable is excess daily liquidity, 
ExDLiqft, which is calculated as lagged daily liquidity, DLiqft-1 in excess of the average net outflows a fund experienced 
during the sovereign debt crisis, Outflowsf,crisis̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  . “C” and “U” stand for constrained and unconstrained funds 
respectively. ‘C+U’ columns include both constrained and unconstrained funds. Conf is a dummy variable which takes 
a value of one for constrained funds and zero for unconstrained funds. Reformt is a dummy variable which takes a value 
of 1 for the after-reform crisis period (June 2011-September 2011) and zero for the before-reform period (January 2009-
December 2009). The ExpOutflowsft are the forecast net outflows and ExpInflowsft are the forecast net inflows. 
FlowVolft is the recursive standard deviation of the NetInflowsft of a fund. NetInflowsft is the difference between the 
monthly fund-level subscriptions and redemptions scaled by lagged net assets. PortRiskft measures the difference 
between the gross yield of the fund portfolio and the 1-month Treasury bill. Sizeft is the log of the net assets of a fund. 
All variables are winsorised at the 1
st and 99th percentiles. In all regressions, we calculate bootstrapped standard errors 
which are clustered by funds (see Appendix A.1 for detailed definitions of all the variables). Significance levels are 





  Table 5. Distribution of Counterfactual Crisis-Level Excess Liquidity 
Panel A: Constrained Funds 
 ExWLiqft ExDLiqft ExWLiq_WCft ExDLiq_WCft 
 BR AR BR AR BR AR BR AR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Mean 15.75 42.54 9.01 24.52 12.26 37.60 5.59 19.57 
SD 11.14 14.90 8.10 14.43 11.92 15.75 9.16 14.74 
p1 -5.20 20.58 -9.36 4.04 -11.86 6.95 -13.93 -7.92 
p5 -1.12 25.66 -1.25 8.74 -9.02 17.43 -7.98 2.28 
p10 0.73 28.76 -0.19 10.05 -3.34 21.39 -4.83 5.84 
p25 8.04 32.00 2.80 13.92 2.98 27.37 -1.16 9.76 
p50 16.64 37.67 8.39 21.09 12.45 33.47 5.08 15.51 
p75 22.96 48.95 13.93 32.08 19.83 45.46 11.55 26.55 
p90 28.68 63.92 20.65 47.20 26.74 60.09 17.56 40.51 
N 180 255 175 255 180 255 175 255 
< Minimum Requirement - 16th  - 10th  - 36th  - 27th  
Liquidity Shortage  8th  0th  12th  0th  18th  0th  29th  3rd  
         
Panel B: Unconstrained Funds 
 ExWLiqft ExDLiqft ExWLiq_WCft ExDLiq_WCft 
 BR AR BR AR BR AR BR AR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Mean 37.53 47.03 23.56 28.27 33.84 41.97 19.85 23.26 
SD 16.11 14.82 15.06 14.26 16.39 16.22 14.82 15.70 
p1 -5.20 22.89 -9.36 2.91 -11.86 11.23 -13.93 -9.15 
p5 15.26 28.43 5.04 10.45 13.09 18.91 -1.13 -0.98 
p10 21.19 31.90 9.56 12.67 15.47 24.08 3.21 6.47 
p25 29.83 36.31 13.85 18.22 22.90 30.97 9.56 11.68 
p50 36.69 43.07 21.78 23.61 32.90 39.21 18.76 20.20 
P75 44.30 52.87 30.17 37.28 42.78 49.34 28.07 33.96 
p90 51.74 74.22 38.70 49.27 51.39 69.63 34.81 46.90 
N 91 140 91 140 91 140 91 140 
< Minimum Requirement - 8th - 5th - 24th - 18th 
Liquidity Shortage  2nd 0th  3rd 0th  2nd 0th  6th 5th 
This table presents the distribution of the counterfactual excess liquidity variables for the before-reform period (BR; 
from January 2009 to December 2009 with quarterly reported data compiled from the N-Q, N-CSRS and N-CSR 
forms filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)) and for the after-reform crisis period (AR; from 
June 2011 to September 2011 with monthly data compiled from the N-MFP form filed with the SEC). Constrained 
funds are funds that held less than 30% weekly liquidity before the reform in 2009Q4. Unconstrained funds are funds 
that held more than or equal to 30% weekly liquidity before the reform in 2009Q4. Excess weekly (daily) liquidity, 
ExWLiqft (ExDLiqft), is calculated as lagged weekly (daily) liquidity, WLiqft-1 (DLiqft-1), in excess of the average 
outflows a fund experienced during the sovereign debt crisis, Outflowsf,crisis̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅. ExWLiq_WCft (ExDLiq_WCft) is the 
worst-case excess weekly (daily) liquidity calculated as the difference between lagged weekly (daily) liquidity, WLiqft-
1 (DLiqft-1), and the highest level of net outflows, Outflowsf,crisis for the sovereign debt crisis (June 2011-September 
2011). ‘<Minimum Requirement’ is the fund-month percentile rank at which funds do not meet the minimum liquidity 
requirement mandated by the SEC 2010 amendments after servicing the redemptions. ‘Liquidity Shortage’ is the 
percentile rank at which the funds no longer have liquidity to meet Outflowsf,crisis. 
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Table 6. Impact of “Know Your Investor” Requirement 
 Panel A: Weekly Liquidity Panel B: Daily Liquidity 
DepVar: WLiqft DLiqft 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
ExpOutflowsft-1 * Crisist  2.691** 2.918*** 2.968*** 2.610** 2.204** 2.654*** 
 (1.187) (1.123) (1.141) (1.284) (1.106) (1.030) 
ExpOutflowsft-1 0.197 0.085 0.065 -0.262 -0.266 -0.277* 
 (0.180) (0.188) (0.166) (0.186) (0.170) (0.162) 
PortRiskft-1 * Crisist 0.295 0.358 0.477** -0.050 0.294*** 0.376*** 
 (0.234) (0.239) (0.223) (0.109) (0.111) (0.107) 
PortRiskft-1 -1.203*** -1.237*** -1.368*** -0.235 -0.578*** -0.734*** 
 (0.337) (0.332) (0.258) (0.154) (0.164) (0.125) 
FlowVolft-1 * Crisist -0.062 -0.009 0.004 0.045 0.154 0.181 
 (0.221) (0.218) (0.205) (0.154) (0.140) (0.135) 
FlowVolft-1 0.167 0.166 0.195* 0.023 0.040 -0.002 
 (0.148) (0.144) (0.114) (0.233) (0.146) (0.098) 
ExpInflowsft-1 * Crisist 0.229 0.109 0.214 0.523 0.244 0.605 
 (0.594) (0.615) (0.595) (0.731) (0.473) (0.421) 
ExpInflowsft-1 0.391 0.453 0.502 -0.538 -0.048 -0.187 
 (0.410) (0.431) (0.387) (0.611) (0.327) (0.315) 
InstShareft-1 -0.036 -0.032 0.002 -0.104 -0.072 0.003 
 (0.139) (0.144) (0.014) (0.147) (0.109) (0.011) 
Crisist 0.544 2.250 8.746** -0.771 13.578* 15.812*** 
 (2.782) (3.441) (4.083) (1.745) (7.171) (5.427) 
Conf * Crisist   -5.223**   -2.430 
   (2.375)   (1.593) 
Conf   -8.152***   -3.081** 
   (2.243)   (1.295) 
Sizeft-1   -0.531   -0.004 
   (0.361)   (0.218) 
       
Constant 48.000*** 45.059*** 60.611*** 27.035** 17.815** 16.432*** 
 (10.918) (11.122) (8.070) (10.961) (8.084) (4.558) 
       
Fund Fixed Effects  Y Y N Y Y N 
Time Fixed Effects N Y Y N Y Y 
Adjusted R2 0.155 0.203 0.211 0.0104 0.546 0.545 
Observations 1,195 1,195 1,195 1,195 1,195 1,195 
Wald Tests:     
ExpOutflowsft-1 (1+Crisist) 2.888** 3.003*** 3.033*** 2.348** 1.938* 2.377*** 
PortRiskft-1 (1+Crisist) -0.908*** -0.879*** -0.891*** -0.285*** -0.284*** -0.358*** 
FlowVolft-1 (1+Crisist) 0.105 0.157 0.199 0.068 0.194 0.179 
ExpInflowsft-1 (1+Crisist) 0.62 0.562 0.716 -0.015 0.196 0.418 
Conf (1+Crisist)   -13.375***   -5.511*** 
This table presents the results of panel regressions that test the ‘know your investor’ requirement. The sample includes 
the crisis period (June 2011-September 2011) and calm period (September 2013-December 2013). The dependent 
variable in Panel A is weekly liquidity, WLiqft, which represents the weekly liquid assets of a fund as a percentage of 
its total portfolio of securities. It includes any security that matures or has a demand feature that allows it to be 
converted to cash within 5 business days, US government agency securities that mature within 60 days, and US 
Treasury securities of any maturity. The dependent variable in Panel B is daily liquidity, DLiqft, which represents the 
daily liquid assets of a fund as a percentage of its total portfolio of securities. It includes any security that matures or 
has a demand feature that allows it to be converted to cash within 1 business day and US Treasury securities of any 
maturity. The Crisist dummy takes a value of one for the crisis period (June 2011-September 2011) and a value of zero 
for the calm period (September 2013-December 2013). The ExpOutflows are the forecast net outflows. PortRiskft 
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measures the difference between the gross yield of the fund portfolio and the 1-month Treasury bill. FlowVolft is the 
rolling standard deviation of NetInflowsft of a fund. NetInflowsft is the difference between the monthly fund-level 
subscriptions and redemptions scaled by lagged net assets. ExpInflowsft are forecast net inflows. InstShareft-1 is the 
percentage of a fund’s net assets held by institutional shareholders.  Conf is a dummy variable which takes a value of 
one for constrained funds and zero for unconstrained funds. Constrained funds are funds that held less than 30% 
weekly liquidity before the reform in 2009Q4. Unconstrained funds are the funds that held more than or equal to 30% 
weekly liquidity before the reform in 2009Q4. All funds that entered the sample only after the reform are classified as 
constrained or unconstrained as described in the definition of the Conf dummy in Appendix A.1. Sizeft is the log of 
the net assets of a fund. All variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles. In all regressions, we calculate 
bootstrapped standard errors which are clustered by funds (see Appendix A.1 for detailed definitions of all the variables). 











































Table 7. Distribution of Eurozone Share of MMFs 
 Eurozone Share, EZBft (%) 
 Calm Crisis 
Mean 15.82 11.95 
SD 8.36 8.42 
Min 0.00 0.00 
Max 40.41 38.40 
p1 0.00 0.00 
p5 1.74 0.00 
p10 4.66 1.52 
p25 9.05 4.88 
p50 16.78 11.08 
p75 22.01 17.72 
p90 26.39 24.69 
p95 28.70 28.16 
p99 34.81 31.20 
N 660 671 
This table presents the distribution of Eurozone share, EZBft which is the share of a fund’s portfolio invested in the 
Eurozone banks that were part of the 2011 stress tests run by the European Banking Authority. The distribution is 






























Table 8. Investors’ Response to MMF Liquidity  
  Panel A: Weekly Liquidity Panel B: Daily Liquidity 
DepVar: NetInflowsft (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
EZBft-1 0.150** 0.130* 0.119*** 0.151** 0.132* 0.130*** 
 (0.064) (0.070) (0.046) (0.062) (0.067) (0.043) 
EZBft-1* Crisist -0.292*** -0.299*** -0.304*** -0.300*** -0.311*** -0.306*** 
 (0.094) (0.095) (0.095) (0.084) (0.084) (0.086) 
WLiqft-1 -0.023 -0.026 -0.039*    
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.024)    
WLiqft-1* Crisist 0.031 0.045 0.062**    
 (0.035) (0.034) (0.030)    
Low EZBft-1 * WLiqft-1 * Crisist -0.006 -0.004 -0.022    
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.018)    
High EZBft-1 * WLiqft-1 * Crisist -0.052** -0.039* -0.035*    
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)    
DLiqft-1    -0.052 -0.056 -0.042 
    (0.054) (0.055) (0.028) 
DLiqft-1* Crisist    0.056 0.062 0.062* 
    (0.040) (0.040) (0.036) 
Low EZBft-1 * DLiqft-1 * Crisist    -0.008 -0.005 -0.031 
    (0.027) (0.027) (0.024) 
High EZBft-1 * DLiqft-1 * Crisist    -0.087** -0.068* -0.062* 
    (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
NetYieldft-1 0.255 0.328* 0.173*** 0.275 0.342** 0.172*** 
 (0.168) (0.170) (0.056) (0.169) (0.171) (0.056) 
NetYieldft-1* Crisist -0.238* -0.163 -0.168* -0.216* -0.146 -0.174* 
 (0.129) (0.129) (0.092) (0.127) (0.130) (0.091) 
ERatioft-1 0.057 0.067 -0.036 0.055 0.066 -0.043 
 (0.063) (0.071) (0.034) (0.065) (0.072) (0.036) 
ERatioft-1* Crisist 0.143** 0.187*** 0.116* 0.168** 0.210*** 0.113* 
 (0.065) (0.066) (0.066) (0.069) (0.072) (0.067) 
InstShareft-1 -1.014*** -0.991*** 0.014* -0.997*** -0.978*** 0.014* 
 (0.213) (0.219) (0.008) (0.209) (0.214) (0.008) 
InstShareft-1* Crisist -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.005 -0.007 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) 
Crisist 2.558 -1.097 -2.378 1.958 -1.093 -1.107 
 (2.969) (3.173) (3.072) (2.737) (3.014) (2.659) 
Conf * Crisist   1.841   1.739 
   (1.127)   (1.148) 
Conf    -1.122*   -1.119* 
   (0.669)   (0.677) 
Sizeft-1   -0.421***   -0.419*** 
   (0.122)   (0.117) 
Constant 79.873*** 78.330*** 9.068*** 78.822*** 77.505*** 8.373*** 
 (17.768) (18.134) (3.204) (17.439) (17.745) (2.939) 
Fund Fixed Effects Y Y N Y Y N 
Time Fixed Effects N Y Y N Y Y 
Adjusted R2 0.0930 0.109 0.103 0.0951 0.123 0.103 
Observations 1,311 1,311 1,311 1,311 1,311 1,311 
Wald Tests:   
EZBft-1 (1+Crisist) -0.142* -0.169** -0.185*** -0.149** -0.179** -0.176*** 
xLiqft-1 (1+Crisist) 0.008 0.019 0.023 0.004 0.006 0.02 
xLiqft-1 [Crisist (1+ Low EZBft-1)] 0.025 0.041 0.04 0.048 0.057 0.031 
xLiqft-1[Crisist (1+ High EZBft-1)] -0.021 0.006 0.027 -0.031 -0.006 0 
xLiqft-1[1+Crisist (1+ Low EZBft-1)] 0.002 0.015 0.001 -0.004 0.001 -0.011 
xLiqft-1[1+Crisist (1+ High EZBft-1)] -0.044 -0.02 -0.012 -0.083 -0.062 -0.042 
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NetYieldft-1 (1+Crisist) 0.017 0.165 0.005 0.059 0.196 -0.002 
ERatioft-1 (1+Crisist) 0.200*** 0.254*** 0.08 0.223*** 0.276*** 0.07 
InstShareft-1 (1+Crisist) -1.021 -0.997 0.007 -1.003 -0.983 0.007 
Conf (1+Crisist)   0.719   0.62 
This table presents the results of panel regressions that measure investors’ response to MMF liquidity. The sample 
includes the calm period (February 2011-May 2011) and crisis period (June 2011-September 2011). The dependent 
variable is NetInflowsft, which is the difference between the monthly fund-level subscriptions and redemptions scaled 
by lagged net assets. EZBft is the share of a fund’s portfolio invested in the Eurozone banks that were part of 2011 
stress tests run by the European Banking Authority. Low EZBft and High EZBft are dummy variables which take a 
value of one for the funds that belong to the lowest and highest EZBft terciles, respectively. The Crisist dummy takes 
a value of one for the crisis period (June 2011-September 2011) and a value of zero for the calm period (February 
2011-May 2011). WLiqft (DLiqft) represents the weekly (daily) liquid assets of a fund as the percentage of its total 
portfolio of securities. NetYieldft-1 is the value-weighted average of the 7-day net yields of share classes as reported 
on the N-MFP forms. It represents the difference between the gross yield and a fund’s expenses. ERatioft-1 is the 
expense ratio of a fund, calculated as the difference between its gross and net yields. GrossYieldft is the value-weighted 
average of issuer yields. InstShareft is the percentage of a fund’s net assets held by institutional shareholders (i.e. 
shareholders who have a minimum investment requirement of $1,000,000). Conf is a dummy variable which takes a 
value of one for constrained funds and zero for unconstrained funds. Constrained funds are funds that held less than 
30% weekly liquidity before the reform in 2009Q4. Unconstrained funds are the funds that held more than or equal to 
30% weekly liquidity before the reform in 2009Q4. All funds that entered the sample only after the reform are 
classified as constrained or unconstrained as described in the definition of the Conf dummy in Appendix A.1. Sizeft is 
the log of the net assets of a fund. All variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles. In all regressions, the 
standard errors are clustered by funds (see Appendix A.1 for detailed definitions of all the variables). Significance 













The percentage of total portfolio assets invested in US government agency securities 
maturing within 60 days. 
Conf 
A dummy variable which identifies constrained funds. Identifying constrained funds 
varies depending on whether their data are available before or only after the reform: 
 
(i) Funds for which before-reform data are available: Funds with less than 30% 
weekly liquidity in 2009Q4 (final quarter of the before-reform period) are classified 
as constrained funds.  
 
(ii) Funds for which before-reform data are not available: After the reform we 
have data for a larger set of funds than before the reform. The funds which are not 
categorized in (i) are classified as constrained or unconstrained based on the distance 
of their average weekly (𝑊𝑙𝑖𝑞̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑓,𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠) and daily (𝐷𝑙𝑖𝑞̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑓,𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠) liquidity during the 
crisis period from the crisis period average weekly and daily liquidity of the funds 
that are already classified as constrained (𝑊𝑙𝑖𝑞̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑓,𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠,𝑐𝑜𝑛  and 𝐷𝑙𝑖𝑞̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑓,𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠,𝑐𝑜𝑛  
respectively) and unconstrained (𝑊𝑙𝑖𝑞̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑓,𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠,𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛 and 𝐷𝑙𝑖𝑞̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑓,𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠,𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛 
respectively). The procedure used to achieve this is as follows:   
 
A= (𝑊𝑙𝑖𝑞̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑓,𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 − 𝑊𝑙𝑖𝑞̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑓,𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠,𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛) + (𝐷𝑙𝑖𝑞̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑓,𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 −  𝐷𝑙𝑖𝑞̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑓,𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠,𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛) 
B= (−𝑊𝑙𝑖𝑞̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑓,𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 + 𝑊𝑙𝑖𝑞̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑓,𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠,𝑐𝑜𝑛) + (−𝐷𝑙𝑖𝑞̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑓,𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 +  𝐷𝑙𝑖𝑞̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑓,𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠,𝑐𝑜𝑛 ) 
Conf = 0   if    A > B 
Conf = 1   if    B >= A  
 
The after-reform period consists of calm and crisis periods. The difference between 
the liquidity of constrained and unconstrained funds is significant only in the crisis 
period (Table 3). Hence, we only use the crisis period to define A and B. 
DLiqft (%) 
Represents the daily liquid assets of a fund as a percentage of its total portfolio of 
securities. DLiqft includes any security that matures or has a demand feature that 
allows it to be converted to cash within 1 business day and US Treasury securities of 
any maturity. 
ERatioft (bp) = GrossYieldft − NetYieldft 
ELMft (bp) 
ELMft is the expected loss at maturity of a fund which is used as a forward-looking 
measure of credit risk. It is the value weighted average of the expected losses of the 
securities in a fund’s portfolio. See below equation A1. 
 




𝑖=1      eq. (A1) 
 
f = Fund 
t = Month 
I = Number of issuers in a fund’s portfolio 
J = Number of securities in a fund’s portfolio 
wit = Proportion of a fund’s total assets invested in security “j” issued by issuer “i". 
rri = Recovery Rate. This is set at 0.40 for all corporate issuers except Japanese banks 
for which we assume it to be 0.35 as in Collins and Gallagher (2016). 
PDit(ttmj)  = Probability of default for issuer “i" in month “t” for security “j” with 
remaining time to maturity “ttm”. 
PD̃it(ttmj) = 1 − [1 − PDit(ttmj)]







 −  
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Is given by predicted NetInflowsft if the predicted value is greater than or equal to 
zero and zero otherwise. Predictions are obtained with an AR(1) regression on 
NetInflows. 
ExpOutflowsft (%) 
Is given by minus predicted NetInflowsft if the predicted value is less than zero and 
zero otherwise. Predictions are obtained with an AR(1) regression on NetInflows. 
EZBft (%) 
=  
∑ OutstandingAmount f,i,t i∈EBank
∑ OutstandingAmount f,i,t i
, EBank includes Eurozone banks that were part of 
2011 stress tests run by the European Banking Authority.  
FlowVolft  (%) 
= Rolling Standard deviation of NetInflowsft , calculated with a fixed window of 
the past 7-month observations. 
GrossYieldft (bp) 
Value-weighted average of issuer yields:   
=  








The share of a fund’s assets in institutional share classes. We define institutional 
share classes as the share classes that have minimum investment of $ 1,000,000 or 
that have “institutional” in the name of the class.   
IssuerYieldit (bp) The yield of invested security as reported on the form N-MFP filed with the SEC. 
NetAssetsft ($) 
NetAssetsft is the value of net assets reported on the N-MFP form and is the total 
value of a fund’s securities and other assets less liabilities. 
NetInflowsft (%) =
(Subscriptionsft −  Redemptionsft) ∗ 100
NetAssetsft−1
    
NetYieldft (bp) 
NetYieldft is the value-weighted average of the 7-day net yields of a fund’s share 
classes as reported on the N-MFP forms. 
NonGovLiqft (%) 
Includes the percentage of total portfolio assets invested in securities maturing within 
5 days, excluding government and agency securities.  
OA0−3m,ft  (%) 
The percentage of total portfolio assets invested in securities with maturities less than 
or equal to 90 days. 
OA9−13m,ft (%) 
The percentage of total portfolio assets invested in securities with maturities ranging 
between 270  and 397 days. 
PortRiskft (bp) 
= GrossYieldft − Tbillt 
 ( Tbillt = 4-Week Treasury bill, secondary market rate, percent, monthly) 
Sizeft = log(NetAssetsft) 
Spread0−3m,ft(bp) 
Measures the difference between the weighted issuer yield of securities maturing 
within 3 months and the 3-month Treasury bill. 
Spread9−13m,ft(bp) 
Measures the difference between the weighted issuer yield of securities maturing 
within 3 months and the 12-month Treasury bill. 
Treasuryft (%) 
The percentage of total portfolio assets invested in US Treasury securities of any 
maturity. 
WALft  (days) 
It is the weighted average life calculated as the dollar-weighted average maturity of a 
fund's portfolio holdings without regard to interest rate reset dates. 
=  
∑ AmortizedCost it     x   TimeToMaturityit  i
∑ AmortizedCost iti
 
i = security held in a fund’s portfolio. 
WLiqft (%) 
Represents the weekly liquid assets of a fund as a percentage of its total portfolio of 
securities. WLiqft includes any security that matures or has a demand feature that 
allows it to be converted to cash within 5 business days, US government agency 




A dummy variable that is equal to one if more than 20% of the MMF is beneficially 
held by affiliated entities at the beginning of the sample period. We construct it by 
identifying internal funds in our sample by name and matching them with the internal 
funds identified in Witmer (2018, Table 1). Our sample includes 21 internal funds.   
 
Institutional_Witft (%) 
The share of a fund’s net assets in institutional share classes. A share class is 
classified as institutional if it has a minimum investment of $100,000 or if its fund 




A.2. Impact of “Know Your Investor” Requirement (Dynamic Panel, System GMM) 
     
 Panel A Panel B 
Dep Var:  WLiqft DLiqft WLiqft DLiqft 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
ExpOutflowsft-1 * Crisist  4.725*** 4.344*** 4.606*** 4.378** 
 (1.601) (1.511) (1.706) (1.722) 
ExpOutflowsft-1 -0.220 -0.367** -0.126 -0.350* 
 (0.203) (0.170) (0.189) (0.182) 
PortRiskft-1 * Crisist 0.216 0.380**   
 (0.230) (0.188)   
PortRiskft-1 -0.864*** -0.626***   
 (0.267) (0.192)   
ELMft-1 * Crisist   0.877** 0.177 
   (0.396) (0.416) 
ELMft-1   -1.422*** -0.610 
   (0.372) (0.433) 
FlowVolft-1 * Crisist 0.325 0.406** 0.222 0.413** 
 (0.235) (0.160) (0.230) (0.164) 
FlowVolft-1 -0.0850 -0.0694 0.036 -0.044 
 (0.169) (0.128) (0.145) (0.154) 
ExpInflowsft-1 * Crisist 0.989 1.696*** 1.186* 1.715*** 
 (0.656) (0.574) (0.712) (0.649) 
ExpInflowsft-1 -0.279 -0.579* -0.279 -0.601 
 (0.586) (0.315) (0.596) (0.400) 
InstShareft-1 -0.00639 -0.0251* -0.010 -0.022 
 (0.0147) (0.0144) (0.015) (0.017) 
Crisist 4.402 -10.21*** 2.443 -7.760*** 
 (3.228) (2.489) (3.102) (2.685) 
WLiqft-1 0.352***  0.438***  
 (0.109)  (0.087)  
DLiqft-1  0.0788  0.061 
  (0.0627)  (0.063) 
Conf * Crisist -10.80*** -3.204* -10.739*** -2.367 
 (2.603) (1.825) (2.596) (2.103) 
Conf -0.556 -1.958 -3.104 -3.700** 
 (2.131) (1.554) (2.268) (1.736) 
Sizeft-1 -0.635* -0.348 -0.865** -0.461 
 (0.377) (0.256) (0.341) (0.309) 
     
Constant 43.24*** 24.15*** 44.448*** 24.749*** 
 (11.70) (5.327) (9.930) (6.566) 
Fund Fixed Effects  Y Y Y Y 
Time Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Observations 1,195 1,195 1,195 1,195 
Wald Tests:     
ExpOutflowsft-1 (1+Crisist) 4.505*** 3.977** 4.480*** 4.028** 





 -0.545** -0.433* 
FlowVolft-1 (1+Crisist) 0.240 0.337** 0.258 0.369** 
ExpInflowsft-1 (1+Crisist) 0.710 1.117 0.907* 1.114** 
Conf (1+Crisist) -11.356*** -5.162*** -13.843*** -6.067*** 
GMM Specification Tests:     
AB test for AR (1) in first differences 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AB test for AR (2) in first differences 0.619 0.948 0.539 0.870 
Hansen Test 0.061 0.141 0.259 0.178 
 
This table presents the results of dynamic panel regressions that test the ‘know your investor’ requirement. Models 
are estimated using system generalized method of moments (GMM). Results are computed for weekly (WLiqft,) 
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and daily (DLiqft) liquidity by using two alternative portfolio risk measures, PortRiskft (Panel A) and ELMft (Panel 
B). The sample includes the crisis period (June 2011-September 2011) and calm period (September 2013-
December 2013). The Crisist dummy takes a value of one for the crisis period (June 2011-September 2011) and a 
value of zero for the calm period (September 2013-December 2013). The ExpOutflows are the forecast net 
outflows. PortRiskft measures the difference between the gross yield of the fund portfolio and the 1-month 
Treasury bill. ELMft is the expected loss at maturity of a fund computed as the value weighted average of the 
expected losses of the securities in the fund’s portfolio. FlowVolft is the rolling standard deviation of NetInflowsft 
of a fund. NetInflowsft is the difference between the monthly fund-level subscriptions and redemptions scaled by 
lagged net assets. ExpInflowsft are forecast net inflows. InstShareft-1 is the percentage of a fund’s net assets held 
by institutional shareholders.  Conf is a dummy variable which takes a value of one for constrained funds and zero 
for unconstrained funds. Constrained funds are funds that held less than 30% weekly liquidity before the reform 
in 2009Q4. Unconstrained funds are the funds that held more than or equal to 30% weekly liquidity before the 
reform in 2009Q4. All funds that entered the sample only after the reform are classified as constrained or 
unconstrained as described in the definition of the Conf dummy in Appendix A.1. Sizeft is the log of the net assets 
of a fund. All variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles. In all regressions, the Windmeijer corrected 
standard errors are reported (see Appendix A.1 for detailed definitions of all the variables). Significance levels are 

















A.3. Investor Response to MMF Liquidity (Extended Sample Jan 2011- April 2015 and 
Additional Variables from Witmer (2018, Table 3)) 
  Panel A: Weekly Liquidity Panel B: Daily Liquidity 
DepVar: NetInflowsft (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
EZBft-1 0.007 -0.011 -0.019 0.014 -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.022) (0.024) (0.019) (0.022) (0.024) (0.017) 
EZBft-1* Crisist -0.091 -0.089 -0.089 -0.115 -0.119 -0.114 
 (0.077) (0.077) (0.074) (0.073) (0.074) (0.072) 
WLiqft-1 -0.088*** -0.096*** -0.068***    
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.015)    
WLiqft-1* Crisist 0.068** 0.072** 0.067**    
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.029)    
Low EZBft * WLiqft-1 * Crisist -0.016 -0.014 -0.014    
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.020)    
High EZBft * WLiqft-1 * Crisist -0.060*** -0.050** -0.047**    
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.021)    
DLiqft-1    -0.077*** -0.078*** -0.052*** 
    (0.020) (0.021) (0.015) 
DLiqft-1* Crisist    0.044 0.048* 0.040 
    (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Low EZBft * DLiqft-1 * Crisist    -0.017 -0.017 -0.018 
    (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) 
High EZBft * DLiqft-1 * Crisist    -0.058*** -0.047** -0.044** 
    (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) 
NetYieldft-1 0.053** 0.032 0.061** 0.056** 0.045* 0.071*** 
 (0.025) (0.022) (0.024) (0.026) (0.024) (0.025) 
NetYieldft-1* Crisist -0.137 -0.079 -0.074 -0.144* -0.090 -0.091 
 (0.086) (0.085) (0.082) (0.084) (0.083) (0.080) 
ERatioft-1 0.019 -0.017 -0.016 0.018 -0.007 -0.014 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.014) (0.020) (0.021) (0.015) 
ERatioft-1* Crisist 0.019 0.062 0.072 0.017 0.056 0.063 
 (0.060) (0.060) (0.057) (0.062) (0.063) (0.059) 
NetInflowsft-1 -0.093*** -0.095*** -0.086*** -0.090*** -0.093*** -0.084*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) 
Crisist 1.068 -1.770 -1.582 3.001* 0.488 0.865 
 (2.381) (2.510) (2.582) (1.729) (1.893) (1.960) 
Institutional_Witft-1  0.029 0.029 0.017*** 0.026 0.027 0.013*** 
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.005) (0.058) (0.057) (0.004) 
Institutional _Witft-1 * Crisist -0.039*** -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.038*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Internal_Witf * Crisist 1.586 1.641 1.893 1.542 1.597 1.930 
 (1.300) (1.301) (1.230) (1.250) (1.248) (1.200) 
Conf * Crisist   -0.401   -0.520 
   (1.050)   (1.038) 
Conf    -0.776**   -0.784** 
   (0.370)   (0.350) 
Sizeft-1   -0.298***   -0.164* 
   (0.109)   (0.095) 
Constant 1.155 2.994** 9.313*** 0.098 1.273 4.597* 
 (1.152) (1.369) (2.860) (1.055) (1.225) (2.401) 
Fund Fixed Effects Y Y N Y Y N 
Time Fixed Effects N Y Y N Y Y 
Adjusted R2 0.0264 0.0470 0.0481 0.0246 0.0446 0.0447 
Observations 7,921 7,921 7,921 7,921 7,921 7,921 
Wald Tests:   






xLiqft-1 (1+Crisist) -0.020 -0.024 -0.001 -0.033 -0.030 -0.012 
xLiqft-1[Crisist (1+ Low EZBft)] 0.052* 0.058** 0.053* 0.027 0.031 0.022 
xLiqft-1[Crisist (1+ High EZBft)] 0.008 0.022 0.020 -0.014 0.001 -0.004 
xLiqft-1[1+Crisist (1+ Low EZBft)] -0.036 -0.038 -0.015 -0.050 -0.047 -0.030 
xLiqft-1[1+Crisist (1+ High EZBft)] -0.080** -0.074** -0.048 -0.091** -0.077** -0.056 
NetYieldft-1 (1+Crisist) -0.084 -0.047 -0.013 -0.088 -0.045 -0.020 
ERatioft-1 (1+Crisist) 0.038 0.045 0.056 0.035 0.049 0.049 
InstShareft-1 (1+Crisist) -0.010 -0.011 -0.023*** -0.011 -0.010 -0.025*** 
Conf (1+Crisist)   -1.177   -1.304 
 
This table presents the results of panel regressions that measure investors’ response to MMF liquidity with an 
extended sample period from January 2011 to April 2015 and the inclusion of variables used in Witmer (2018, 
Table 3) which are not included in our original regressions in Table 8. The dependent variable is NetInflowsft, 
which is the difference between the monthly fund-level subscriptions and redemptions scaled by lagged net assets. 
EZBft is the share of a fund’s portfolio invested in the Eurozone banks that were part of 2011 stress tests run by 
the European Banking Authority. Low EZBft and High EZBft are dummy variables which take a value of one for 
the funds that belong to the lowest and highest EZBft terciles, respectively. The Crisist dummy takes a value of 
one for the crisis period (June 2011-September 2011) and a value of zero for the calm period (February 2011-May 
2011). WLiqft (DLiqft) represents the weekly (daily) liquid assets of a fund as the percentage of its total portfolio 
of securities. NetYieldft-1 is the value-weighted average of the 7-day net yields of share classes as reported on the 
N-MFP forms. It represents the difference between the gross yield and a fund’s expenses. ERatioft-1 is the expense 
ratio of a fund, calculated as the difference between its gross and net yields. GrossYieldft is the value-weighted 
average of issuer yields. Institutional_Witft is the dollar value of institutional share classes divided by net assets. 
A share class is classified as institutional if it has a minimum investment requirement of $100,000 or if its fund 
fees are below 10 basis points for the entire sample period. Internal_Witf is a dummy variable that is equal to one 
if more than 20% of the MMF is beneficially held by affiliated entities at the beginning of the sample period. Conf 
is a dummy variable which takes a value of one for constrained funds and zero for unconstrained funds. 
Constrained funds are funds that held less than 30% weekly liquidity before the reform in 2009Q4. Unconstrained 
funds are the funds that held more than or equal to 30% weekly liquidity before the reform in 2009Q4. All funds 
that entered the sample only after the reform are classified as constrained or unconstrained as described in the 
definition of the Conf dummy in Appendix A.1. Sizeft is the log of the net assets of a fund. All variables are 
winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles. In all regressions, the standard errors are clustered by funds (see 
Appendix A.1 for detailed definitions of all the variables). Significance levels are indicated by *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05 and * p<0.1. 
 
